Demystifying legal reasoning [electronic resource] / Larry Alexander, Emily Sherwin.

By:

Alexander, Larry, 1943-

Contributor(s):

Material type: Text

TextSeries: Cambridge introductions to philosophy and lawPublication details: New York : Cambridge University Press, 2008.Description: viii, 253 pISBN:

9780511409080
0511409087

Subject(s):

DDC classification:

340/.1 22

LOC classification:

K213 .A425 2008

Online resources:

Available to Stanford-affiliated users. Click here to download

Contents:

Part I. Law and its Function: 1. Moral controversy; Part II. Common Law Reasoning: Deciding Cases When Prior Judicial Decisions Determine the Law: 2. Ordinary reason applied to law: natural reasoning and deduction from rules; 3. The mystification of common-law reasoning; 4. Common law practice; Part III. Reasoning from Canonical Legal Text: 5. Interpreting statutes and other posited rules; 6. Infelicities of the intended meaning of canonical texts and norms constraining interpretation; 7. Non-intentionalist interpretation; 8. Is constitutional interpretation different? Why it isn't and is; 9. All or nothing.

Summary: Demystifying Legal Reasoning defends the proposition that there are no special forms of reasoning peculiar to law. Legal decision makers engage in the same modes of reasoning that all actors use in deciding what to do: open-ended moral reasoning, empirical reasoning, and deduction from authoritative rules. This book addresses common law reasoning when prior judicial decisions determine the law, and interpretation of texts. In both areas, the popular view that legal decision makers practice special forms of reasoning is false.

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Holdings
Item type	Current library	Collection	Call number	URL	Status	Date due	Barcode	Item holds
e-book	KNCHR Library SharePoint	Non-Fiction	K213 .A425 2008 (Browse shelf(Opens below))	Link to resource	Available

Total holds: 0

Includes bibliographical references (p. 237-245) and index.

Demystifying Legal Reasoning defends the proposition that there are no special forms of reasoning peculiar to law. Legal decision makers engage in the same modes of reasoning that all actors use in deciding what to do: open-ended moral reasoning, empirical reasoning, and deduction from authoritative rules. This book addresses common law reasoning when prior judicial decisions determine the law, and interpretation of texts. In both areas, the popular view that legal decision makers practice special forms of reasoning is false.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest, 2015. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries.

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