A common law theory of judicial review : the living tree / W.J. Waluchow.
Material type:
- text
- unmediated
- volume
- 0521864763 (hardback)
- 9780521864763 (hardback)
- 347.71/012 22
- KE4248 .W35 2007
- KE4248 .W35 2007
Item type | Current library | Collection | Call number | URL | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
![]() |
KNCHR Library SharePoint | Non-Fiction | KE4248 .W35 2007 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) | Link to resource | Available |
Browsing KNCHR Library shelves, Shelving location: SharePoint, Collection: Non-Fiction Close shelf browser (Hides shelf browser)
No cover image available |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
![]() |
||
KD3410.I54 M335 2009 Autonomy, informed consent and medical law | KD4080 .J83 2007 Judicial reasoning under the UK Human Rights Act | KD8406 .A975 2005 Sentencing and criminal justice / | KE4248 .W35 2007 A common law theory of judicial review : | KF382 .T36 2006 Law as a means to an end | KF540 .D89 2006 The relationship rights of children | KF1250.A2 E97 2005 Exploring tort law / |
Includes bibliographical references (pages [273]-278) and index.
Acknowledgements -- A charter revolution -- Constitutionalism -- Why charters? -- The critics' case -- A mixed blessing -- Common law constitutionalism.
In this study, W. J. Waluchow argues that debates between defenders and critics of constitutional bills of rights presuppose that constitutions are more or less rigid entities. Within such a conception, constitutions aspire to establish stable, fixed points of agreement and pre-commitment, which defenders consider to be possible and desirable, while critics deem impossible and undesirable. Drawing on reflections about the nature of law, constitutions, the common law, and what it is to be a democratic representative, Waluchow urges a different theory of bills of rights that is flexible and adaptable. Adopting such a theory enables one not only to answer to critics' most serious challenges, but also to appreciate the role that a bill of rights, interpreted and enforced by unelected judges, can sensibly play in a constitutional democracy.
There are no comments on this title.