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The limits of Leviathan [electronic resource] : contract theory and the enforcement of International Law / Robert E. Scott, Paul B. Stephan.

By: Contributor(s): Material type: TextTextPublication details: Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, c2006.Description: viii, 255 pISBN:
  • 0511249977
  • 9780511249976
  • 9780511250484
  • 0511250487
  • 0511247834
  • 9780511247835
  • 0511251319
  • 9780511251313
  • 9780511511370
  • 051151137X
  • 9780521858465
Subject(s): DDC classification:
  • 341 22
LOC classification:
  • K2330 .S36 2006
Online resources:
Contents:
States, firms and the enforcement of international law -- Lessons from contract theory -- A model of optimal enforcement -- Patterns of international law enforcement -- The choice between formal and informal enforcement -- The future of international law enforcement.
Summary: Much of international law, like much of contract, is enforced not by independent sanctions but rather through cooperative interaction among the parties, with repeat dealings, reputation, and a preference for reciprocity doing most of the enforcement work. Originally published in 2006, The Limits of Leviathan identifies areas in international law where formal enforcement provides the most promising means of promoting cooperation and where it does not. In particular, it looks at the International Criminal Court, the rules for world trade, efforts to enlist domestic courts to enforce orders of the International Court of Justice, domestic judicial enforcement of the Geneva Convention, the domain of international commercial agreements, and the question of odious debt incurred by sovereigns. This book explains how international law, like contract, depends largely on the willingness of responsible parties to make commitments.
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Item type Current library Collection Call number URL Status Date due Barcode Item holds
e-book e-book KNCHR Library SharePoint Non-Fiction K2330 .S36 2006 (Browse shelf(Opens below)) Link to resource Available
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Includes index.

States, firms and the enforcement of international law -- Lessons from contract theory -- A model of optimal enforcement -- Patterns of international law enforcement -- The choice between formal and informal enforcement -- The future of international law enforcement.

Much of international law, like much of contract, is enforced not by independent sanctions but rather through cooperative interaction among the parties, with repeat dealings, reputation, and a preference for reciprocity doing most of the enforcement work. Originally published in 2006, The Limits of Leviathan identifies areas in international law where formal enforcement provides the most promising means of promoting cooperation and where it does not. In particular, it looks at the International Criminal Court, the rules for world trade, efforts to enlist domestic courts to enforce orders of the International Court of Justice, domestic judicial enforcement of the Geneva Convention, the domain of international commercial agreements, and the question of odious debt incurred by sovereigns. This book explains how international law, like contract, depends largely on the willingness of responsible parties to make commitments.

Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, MI : ProQuest, 2015. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest affiliated libraries.

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